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ARTICLES
IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN




Since 1948, the Inter-American human rights system' has evolved
into the most ambitious institutional framework in the world for pro-
moting and protecting human rights. The basic legal documents of the
system,' drafted within the context of the Organization of American
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law.
1. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, protocol of Amend. Feb. 23, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter OAS Charter]; HANDBOOK OF ExtSTING RULES PER-
TAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.65,
doc. 6 (1985) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The Inter-American system has two legal
sources, one of which is the OAS Charter. Id. Thirty-two states of the Western Hemi-
sphere are members of the OAS and are subject to its human rights program. Id. at
inside back cover. The other source is in the American Convention on Human Rights.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OEA/ser. L./V/1I.23, doc. 2 rev. 6, 1, O.A.S.O.R. OEA/ser. K./XVI/I.1, doc. 65 rev.
I corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention];
HANDBOOK at 11. The nineteen OAS states that have ratified the Convention include:
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pan-
ama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at 63. The non-ratifying OAS member states
are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, Paraguay, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad
and Tobago, and the United States. Id.
2. OAS Charter, supra note 1; Convention, supra note 1; American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 2, 1948, by the Ninth International Con-
ference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note I,
at 17-25 [hereinafter American Declaration]; the Statute of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note I at 103-13 [hereinaf-
ter Commission Statute]; Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 115-42 [hereinafter Commission
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States (OAS), recognize civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights.3 These OAS documents established the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights4 and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.5 These legal instruments grant to the Commission the authority
to review complaints from individuals and groups or to initiate its own
proceedings concerning human rights violations by any OAS member
state.' The Commission has the authority to undertake country-wide
studies of human rights practices, including on-site investigations.7 The
Commission also has the right to take urgent, interim measures where
necessary to avoid irreparable harm, 8 and the authority to make recoin-
Regulations]; Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, reprinted in
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 143-54 [hereinafter Court Statute]; Rules of Procedure of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at
155-74 [hereinafter Court Rules].
3. American Declaration, supra note 2. The Declaration protects basic rights, in-
cluding: life, liberty, personal security, equality before the law, religious freedom, free-
dom of expression and opinion, privacy and family life, residence and movement, health
and well-being, education, work, social security, civil rights, fair trial, nationality, vote,
assembly, association, property, petition, due process, and asylum. Id. American Con-
vention, supra note 1. The Convention contains 22 broad categories of guaranteed
rights. Id. A broad non-discrimination clause and an obligation on the part of all states
to respect and ensure the rights and freedoms reinforce these provisions. Id. art. 1. See
INTER-AM. C.H.R., 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT 22, OEA/ser. L./V/I 1.68, doc. 8 rev. 1
(1986) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT] (inviting member states to present spe-
cific proposals for the draft of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention).
4. OAS Charter, supra note 1, arts. 51(e), 112, 150; Convention, supra note 1,
arts. 33-34. The OAS General Assembly elects the seven members of the Commission
in an individual capacity to a term of four years. OAS Charter, supra note 1, art.
51(e); American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 33, 35. The Commission represents all
member states of the OAS as both an organ of the OAS and of the Convention. OAS
Charter, supra note 1, art. 112. Its principal function as an OAS organ is to promote
the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of
the Organization in these matters. Id. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 41. The
Convention sets out in greater detail the functions of the Commission, the central one
of which is the promotion and defense of human rights. Id.
5. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 33. The Court consists of seven judges
nominated from among nationals of the member states of the OAS. Id. art. 52. Judges
are elected to the Court in an individual capacity by a vote of the state parties to the
Convention. Id. art. 52. The Judges of the Court are to be of the highest moral author-
ity, of recognized competence in the field of human rights, and must possess the qualifi-
cations required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions in the state of nation-
ality or of the state which nominates them. Id. The judges are elected for a term of six
years and may be reelected only once. Id. art. 54. See Court Statute, supra note 2,
arts. 18-20 (describing the duties and responsibilities of Inter-American Court judges).
6. American Convention, supra note I, arts. 44-45. Unlike other human rights in-
stitutions, the right of individual petition is automatic in the Inter-American system;
the ability of one state to file a complaint against another is optional. Id.; Commission
Statute, supra note 2, arts. 18-20; Commission Regulations, supra note 2, art. 26.
7. Commission Statute, supra note 2, arts. 18(c), 18(g); Commission Regulations,
supra note 2, art. 62.
8. Commission Statute, supra note 2, art. 19(c); Commission Regulations, supra
note 2, art. 29.
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mendations to states regarding the promotion and protection of human
rights.'
The Court, on the other hand, may hear cases between states that
are parties to the Convention or against a state at the request of the
Commission, if the state has so declared. 10 Where appropriate, the
Court may award compensation to victims of human rights violations'
1
or may take provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity. 2 The
Court also has the most extensive advisory jurisdiction of any interna-
tional juridical body.'
3
The lengthy catalogue of human rights and the extensive enforce-
ment powers of Inter-American institutions create the potential for an
extremely effective human rights system for the Western Hemisphere.
The system, however, does not entirely live up to its potential. While
there are certainly responsibilities that the institutions perform well,
other activities operate less successfully. Moreover, the Commission
and Court cannot fulfill some functions due to legal or practical rea-
-sons. An evaluation of these activities and functions demonstrates
which aspects of the Inter-American system need improvement and
where improvements can in fact be implemented.
I. INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
The principal functions of the Commission include promoting the ob-
servance and protection of human rights and serving as a consultative
organ of the OAS in human rights matters. 4 In exercising these func-
tions, the Commission has been granted specific powers,' 5 including:
(1) making recommendations to member states on progressive measures of im-
plementation and observance of human rights;
(2) preparing studies or reports;
(3) requesting information on human rights from governments of member states;
(4) responding to inquiries from member states and providing advisory services;
9. Commission Statute, supra note 2, arts. 18(b), 20(b).
10. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 62.
11. Id. art. 63(1).
12. Id. art. 63(2).
13. Shelton, Implementation Procedures of the American Convention on Human
Rights, 26 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 238, 251-61 (1983). See Convention, supra note 1, art.
64 (defining the advisory power of the Inter-American Court); Buergenthal, The Advi-
sory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court 79 A. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-5
(1985) (describing the advisory and jurisdictional capacity of the Inter-American
Court).
14. Commission Statute, supra note 2, art. 1(2).
15. American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 41-42. The OAS Charter specifies
that the Convention determines the structure, competence, and procedures of the Com-
mission. OAS Charter, supra note 1, art. 112.
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and
(5) acting on petitions and communications."6
The Statute of the Commission further implements and clarifies
these powers in relation to OAS member states that have not ratified
the Convention, as well as those that are parties to the Convention. The
most significant difference concerns the substantive rights protected:
State Parties to the Convention must implement the guarantees of the
American Convention, while other OAS member states must grant the
rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man. 7
Any OAS state may be the object of a country study for which the
Commission may request permission to conduct on-site observations.18
Country reports need not arise within the context of individual or inter-
state petitions. Rather, they may proceed on the basis of a request by
the OAS General Assembly,19 on the Commission's own motion, 0 or at
the request of the government involved. 1
In most cases, the Commission undertakes such studies whenever it
receives reliable evidence of widespread human rights violations within
a country. To date the Commission has put forth country reports on
nearly half of the OAS member states.2 These include both states that
have ratified the Convention and those that have not.
16. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 41.
17. Commission Statute, supra note 2, art. 1(2).
18. Id. art. 18(c), (g).
19. INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA
1, 1, OEA/ser. L./V/II.53, doc. 6 rev. 2 (1981). In the case of Bolivia, the Permanent
Council of the OAS and the General Assembly requested that the Commission under-
take the study after a 1980 military coup. Id.
20. INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATE-
MALA, 7, OEA/ser. L./V/II.53, doc. 21 rev. 2 (1981). The Guatemala report was is-
sued on the initiative of the Commission because of continued generalized violence
within the country. Id.
21. INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA
1, OEA/ser. L./V/II.44, doc. 38 rev. 1 (1978). General Omar Torrijos, the former
Panamanian head of State, requested the 1977 on-site observation and report on Pan-
ama. Id. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL
SALVADOR 11, OEA/ser. L./V/II.46, doc. 23 rev. 1 (1978) (inviting the Commission
to visit through a request of the government); INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI 2-3, OEA/ser. L./V/II.46, doc. 66 rev. 1
(1979) (same); INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NICARAGUA 11, OEA/ser. L./V/II.53, doc. 25 (1981) (same).
22. See HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 192-94 (listing the published country reports
through 1984: Cuba (1962, 1963, 1967, 1970, 1977, 1979, 1983), Dominican Republic
(1965, 1966), Haiti (1969, 1979), Honduras (1970), Chile (1974, 1976, 1977, 1985),
Paraguay (1978), Uruguay (1978), Panama (1978), Nicaragua (1978, 1981, 1984
[Miskito Population]), El Salvador (1978), Argentina (1980), Colombia (1981), Gua-
temala (1981, 1983, 1985), Bolivia (1981), Suriname (1983, 1985)).
[VOL. 3:323326
1988] IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS 327
Most of the significant successes of the Commission stem from the
publication of country reports based upon on-site observations. In the
course of making its reports, the Commission has discovered torture
chambers23 and disappeared persons.2 The Commission has also suc-
ceeded in obtaining the repeal of objectionable laws through its re-
ports. 5 In one instance, the strength of the Commission report resulted
in a resolution of the OAS calling for the overthrow of the country's
government.26 As characterized by the Commission, this resolution, for
the first time in OAS history, deprived an incumbent government of a
member state of legitimacy based on that government's human rights
violations committed against its own population. 7
In contrast to country studies, no cases concerning private individu-
als have led to any OAS action. Unlike others, this human rights sys-
tem guarantees the right of petition as against all states members of
the OAS, while inter-state complaints remain merely optional for states
parties to the Convention. 2 The provisions governing private access to
the Inter-American system afford greater possibility for filing petitions
than in any other international human rights system20 and give the
Commission great flexibility in implementing its procedures. Thus, the
description of the individual petition machinery as a complete failure is
ironic given the accessability of the Commission to private
individuals.30
Individual cases can become lost in a system better designed to deal
23. INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SAL-
VADOR 97, OEA/ser. L./V/II.46, doc. 23 rev. 1 (1978).
24. T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS, AND D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAS 171-81 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter PROTECTING HUbIAN RIGHTS].
25. INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA
50-51, OEA/ser. L./V/II.44, doc. 38 rev. 1 (1978). In Panama, government decree
No. 342, affecting the right of fair trial, was repealed during the visit of the Commis-
sion. Id.
26. 17th Mtg. of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C.),
OEA ser. F/I1.17, doc. 40, rev. 2 (1979). The 1979 resolution on Nicaragua found that
the inhumane conduct of the dictatorial regime governing the country, as evidenced by
the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, was the fundamental
cause of the dramatic situation facing the Nicaraguan people. Id. The resolution de-
dared that the solution to problems of Nicaragua should be based upon immediate and
definitive replacement of the Somoza regime. Id.
27. INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICA-
RAGUA, 2, OEA/ser. L./V/I.53, doc. 25 (1981) at 2.
28. American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 44-45; Commission Statute, supra
note 2, art. 20.
29. Commission Regulations, supra note 2, art. 26. Unlike the European system,
access is not restricted to victims of violations. Id.
30. Buergenthal, Implementation in the Inter-American Human Rights System, in
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (R. Berhardt & J. Jolovisz,
eds. 1987).
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with wide-spread violations. 1 The Commission has applied its proce-
dural rules inconsistently on individual cases, and its legal analysis is
not always convincing. 2 These factors may affect the willingness of
states to cooperate in the petition procedures. Moreover, far less serious
consequences result from the decision in an individual case than from a
country study because the OAS General Assembly has never acted on
Commission findings in an individual case.
Governments usually fail to respond to Commission requests for in-
formation in individual cases, resulting in a presumption of the truth of
the allegations. In only two of the first twenty-four individual cases
considered after the Convention came into force did the government in
question respond fully to the Commission's inquiries.3 3 The allegations
included torture, kidnappings, involuntary disappearances, arbitrary ar-
rests, and murder. With even minimal cooperation lacking and no polit-
ical will in the OAS General Assembly to pressure governments, indi-
vidual remedies failed to materialize. The Commission subsequently
prepared country studies on the countries involved.
Unlike the Commission, the Court derives its powers from the Con-
vention rather than from the OAS Charter. The Court only has juris-
diction over contentious cases involving states parties to the Conven-
tion.3 The Court's advisory jurisdiction, however, extends to all OAS
member states and all OAS organs. 5 The jurisdiction of the Court ap-
plies to the interpretation of the Convention and other treaties concern-
ing the protection of human rights in the American States, as well as to
the compatibility of any domestic law in a member state with interna-
tional human rights agreements. 6
Most of the work of the Court to date has been advisory. 37 Both the
31. Id.
32. See Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American System:
The Case of Baby Boy, 2 HUM. RTs. L.J. 309, 309-10 (1981) [hereinafter Baby Boy]
(noting that the Commission reached conclusions in the Baby Boy case with questiona-
ble reasoning, faulty analysis, and with little attention to canons of construction of
international documents); Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 164-183, OEA/ser. L./
V/II.69, doc. 17 rev. 3 (1987) (citing the opinion of the Commission and the dissent of
Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra); see also infra notes 58-62 (discussing the reason-
ing of the Commission in case 9647).
33. INTER-AM. C.H.R., ANNUAL REPORT 1970, OEA/ser. L./V/II.25, doc. 9. The
cases concerned three countries: Bolivia (9 cases), Guatemala (13 cases), and Jamaica
(2 cases). Id. Only Jamaica responded fully. Id. See IACHR ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 3, at 37-127 (citing more recent examples of governments that failed to cooperate
with Commission inquiries).
34. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 61.
35. Id. art. 64.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (American Convention
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Commission and state governments have seemed unwilling in the past
to utilize the Court as a means to decide individual human rights cases.
Recently, however, the Commission has referred some matters to the
Court for decision. 8
II. EVALUATION
An effective international system requires certain elements to remedy
and to prevent recurrences of human rights violations. These elements
include responding quickly to communications, obtaining credible evi-
on Human Rights arts. 8, 25, 27(2)) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-
9/87 of Oct. 6), ser. A: Judgments and Opinions No. 9 (1987) (finding that essential
judicial guarantees include judicial procedures inherent in the representative democ-
racy as a form of government); Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (American
Convention on Human Rights arts. 27(2), 25(1), 7(6)) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory
Opinion No. OC-8/87 of Jan. 30), ser. A: Judgments and Opinions No. 8 (1987) (stat-
ing that the writs of habeas corpus and of "amparo" are among the judicial remedies
which may not be suspended under article 27(2)); Enforceability of the Right to Reply
or Correction (American Convention on Human Rights arts. 14(1), 1(1), 2) (Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-7/86 of Aug. 29), ser. A: Judgments and
Opinions No. 7 (1986) (clarifying the obligations of states parties to ensure enjoyment
of the right to reply or correction to anyone subject to their jurisdiction); The Word
"Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-6/86 of May 9), ser. A: Judgments and Opinions
No. 6 (1986) (interpreting the word "laws" as a general legal norm tied to the general
welfare passed by legislative bodies of democratic governments); Compulsory Member-
ship in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (American
Convention on Human Rights, arts. 13, 29) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion
No. OC-5/85 of Nov. 13), ser. A: Judgments and Opinions No. 5 (1985) (voting unan-
imously that compulsory licensing of journalists as incompatible with article 13 of the
Convention); Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political
Constitution of Costa Rica (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-4/84 of
Jan. 19), ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 4 (1984) (finding a proposed amend-
ment to the constitution of Costa Rica in part permissible and in part contrary to the
American Convention); Restrictions to the Death Penalty (American Convention on
Human Rights arts. 4(2), 4(4)) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83
of Sept. 8), ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983) (stating that the Convention
restricts the death penalty and does not allow states parties to extend application of the
death penalty to post-ratification legislation unless they reserve the right to do so); The
Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention (arts. 74,
75) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24), ser. A: Judg-
ments and Opinions, No. 2 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983) (stating when the
Convention enters into force for states that ratified or adhered to it with reservation);
Other Treaties Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, (American Con-
vention art. 64) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) (Advisory Opinion No. OC-1/82 of Sept. 24),
ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 1 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 51 (1983) (clari-
fying the position of the Court in interpreting article 64 when issuing an advisory opin-
ion on a particular topic).
38. See IACHR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 40-51 (referring the Commis-
sion resolutions of petitions filed regarding human rights violations in Honduras to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for a determination whether Honduras vio-
lated rights guaranteed in the American Convention).
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dence, issuing well-reasoned, authoritative legal opinions on the find-
ings, and widely publicizing the results. A need for improvement in the
Inter-American system can be cited for all these above.
A. SPEED OF RESPONSE
Both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court
are able to take immediate measures and sometimes do so with speed
unparallelled in other human rights institutions. In the case of Chile,
for example, the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commis-
sion arrived in Santiago within three and a half weeks after the coup
d'6tat in 1973.39 In contrast, the United Nations' on-site visit occurred
five years later.40 Similarly, in the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis, the
Commission received a cable from the new government of the Domini-
can Republic on May 25, 1965, requesting an on-site visit.4 1 After con-
sultations, the Commission responded by sending a representative on
June 1, 1965.42
This type of quick action is important when responding to crises that
threaten human rights. The ability of the system to respond quickly is
one of its strengths and should be applied wherever possible. Unfortu-
nately, the record for responses to individual cases is less positive than
that for country studies. In some relatively recent cases, the Commis-
sion has taken up to five years to conclude its review of an individual
petition.43
Speed is particularly important where serious and permanent injury
may occur. For example, in a death penalty case, United States officials
refused requests from the Commission to stay the executions of two
juvenile offenders pending decisions on their petitions.44 The Commis-
39. See Shelton, Utilization of Fact-Finding Missions to Promote and Protect
Human Rights: The Chile Case, 2 Hum. RTs. L.J. 1, 25, (1981) (stating that reports
of reduced killings and torture occurred after the initial visit of the Executive Secretary
of the Commission).
40. See id. at 12 (stating that on September 26, 1973, the Inter-American Com-
mission requested, and ten days later received, permission to send its Secretary to
Chile); see also U.N. GAOR, Protection of Human Rights in Chile: Report of the
Economic and Social Council, Annex VII, U.N. Doc. A/33/331 (1978) (incorporating
the text of the agreement permitting the visit into the on-site visit report).
41. INTER-AM. C.H.R., Report on the Activities of the Inter-American Charter of
Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, OEA/ser. L./V/Il.13, doc. 14 rev. 2
(1965).
42. Id.
43. Case 7920, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 40, OEA/ser. L./V/II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986).
In this case the Commission received the petition on October 7, 1981 and adopted the
resolution on April 18, 1986. Id.
44. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 150, OEA/ser. L./V/II.69, doc. 17 rev. 3
(1987).
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sion subsequently concluded, five votes to one, that in carrying out the
executions the United States government violated article I (right to
life) and article II (equality of treatment and equality before the law)
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Ameri-
can Declaration).45
B. FACT-FINDING
Of the necessary requirements for an effective international human
rights system, the Commission performs fact-finding best. The Com-
mission's country reports have no parallel in other human rights institu-
tions, and, as noted above, the results have been dramatic in some
cases. Amendments to the rules of procedure have cured some of the
early problems, such as apparent conflicts of interest of study team
members. 46 The Regulations also guarantee access to persons and docu-
mentation important for fact-finding.47 Implementing standards for the
collection of evidence might strengthen the procedure; enhancing the
credibility of findings is important to promote the appearance of fair-
ness in the proceedings. 8
Moreover, in the areas of speed of response and fact-finding, the
Commission could contribute further to improving human rights in the
hemisphere if it adopted a "medical" model for promoting human
rights that would look to prevent human rights violations rather than to
attempt to cure already disastrous situations. Monetary compensation
is far inferior to the prevention of torture and disappearances. Thus,
the Commission should adopt as a major function the use of advisory
services, a trend that is growing in the United Nations. 9 With the re-
turn to democracy in many countries in the hemisphere, the time is
ideal for participation in restoring and protecting human rights through
military and police training programs, educational programs on human
rights obligations for public servants and political leaders, and the
45. Id. at 150-51.
46. See Commission Regulations, supra note 2, art. 56 (stating that a Commission
member who is a national of or who resides in the State in which the on-site observa-
tion is to be carried out shall be disqualified from participating in the on-site
observation).
47. Id. art. 59.
48. See International Law Association "Draft Minimal Rules of Procedure for In-
ternational Human Rights Fact-Finding Missions," Belgrade Conference (1980), re-
printed in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 163-64 (outlining possible
procedures for gathering evidence).
49. See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 41 (providing in the enumeration
of functions and powers of the Commission, particularly paragraphs (b) and (e), that
the Commission can provide advisory services).
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availability of expert legal consultants on drafting and implementing
laws for the protection of human rights. In addition, where the threat
of violations exist, as in Haiti, a permanent or long-term visible pres-
ence may be necessary to avoid irreparable harm.
C. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The dual role of the Commission as fact-finder and decision-maker
undercuts the authority of its legal analysis even when well done, which
is not always the case. Some Commission decisions are poorly reasoned
and confusing insofar as they fail to apply controlling procedural rules
and ignore accepted international canons of interpretation. The recent
opinion concerning execution of juvenile offenders in the United States
is one example of problematic analysis. 51 Read broadly, the Commis-
sion's opinion can be interpreted as stating that the United States fed-
eral system of criminal justice violates international human rights law.
Read more narrowly, the opinion prohibits varying punishment when
that punishment touches upon a fundamental right such as the right to
life.
In its analysis, the Commission reaffirms the binding juridical char-
acter of the American Declaration. 52 The Commission fails, however,
to articulate rules of interpretation for the Declaration. The dissent
states that the Commission mistakenly relied on the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties5" since the Declaration is not a public treaty.'
The dissent analyzes the Declaration on the basis of the travaux
pr~paratoires.55 If the Declaration has binding force as a statement of
50. See Baby Boy, supra note 32, at 310 (concluding that the Commission em-
ployed faulty analysis and gave minimal attention to accepted interpretations of inter-
national documents in deciding a case).
51. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 164-73, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.69, doc. 17 rev.
3 (1987).
52. Id. para. 48. The Commission first held the Declaration binding on member
states of the OAS in case 2141. Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, 38-39, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.52, doc. 48 rev. 52 (1981).
53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27 reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force
on Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
54. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 150, 173-83, OEA/ser. L./V/II.69, doc. 17 rev.
3 (1987) (dissenting opinion of Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra) (stating that the
treaty is not enforceable because necessary steps were not followed for its adoption,
authentication, and manifestation).
55. Id. The vote and filing of the dissent raises an ambiguous procedural question
not addressed in the Regulations. Id. As noted in the Commission's opinion, the Com-
mission executed and adopted its final decision on March 27, 1987, and the dissenting
member, Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, was not present at the meeting for the
discussion and vote. Id. para. 20. A note at the conclusion of the opinion states that Dr.
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra reserved the right to present an explanation of his vote
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international human rights norms, then it seems entirely appropriate
that the customary rules of interpretation of treaties codified in the Vi-
enna Convention should apply to it. 6 Finding the Declaration silent on
the issue of capital punishment, the Commission sought to interpret its
provisions by determination and application of rules of customary inter-
national law. This approach is consistent with the interpretive rules of
the Vienna Convention.57
The Commission found no norm of customary international law
prohibiting execution of those under the age of eighteen, although it
did find such a norm to be emerging.58 It then unnecessarily decided
that even were such a norm proven it would not bind the United States
because it had protested the norm through proposed reservations to ar-
ticle 4 of the American Convention." This did not end the matter,
however, because the Commission found that a customary norm that
has acquired the status of jus cogens will bind a state even without its
consent. Without discussing the validity, authority, or content of the
concept of jus cogens, the Commission concluded that a recognized
norm of jus cogens exists in the member states of the OAS that prohib-
its the execution of children.60 This finding was not dispositive, because
the Commission found no agreement on the age to which the norm
applies.61 Ultimately, the Commission based its decision that the
United States violated the American Declaration on differing state
practices in applying the death penalty.
62
The Commission's decision contains several problems in addition to
its holding questioning the legality of a federal criminal justice system.
For the Commission to find an emerging but not yet existing customary
in this case. Id. para. 65. Meanwhile, the Commission Regulations imply that members
will be present during discussions and votes on decisions. Commission Regulations,
supra note 2, arts. 19-21.
56. See Vienna Convention, supra note 52, art. 31(l) (providing that a treaty must
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose).
Article 32 of the Convention permits recourse to the travaux prbparatoires or an agree-
ment only to confirm the meaning revealed by application of article 31 or to determine
the meaning of the text if application of article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure, or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. Id. art. 32.
57. See id. art. 31(3)(c) (requiring that relevant rules of international law applica-
ble to the parties be considered in interpreting international documents).
58. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 172, para 60, OEA/ser. L./V/II.69, dec.
17 rev. 3 (1987).
59. Id. paras. 53-54.
60. Id. paras. 54-56.
61. Id. para. 57.
62. Id. para. 62 (mentioning that if a child commits murder in one state, the child
may be subject to the death penalty, whereas if the same individual commits the same
offense in another state, the child is not subject to the death penalty).
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norm prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders while at the same
time finding a recognized norm of jus cogens prohibiting the execution
of children is confusing and somewhat contradictory. The lack of cited
authority or support for its findings exacerbates the confusion. In addi-
tion, the Commission's discussion of United States objections to a cus-
tomary norm misstates international law and overlooks relevant evi-
dence on this point. For a customary international norm to not bind a
state, that state must persistently object, not merely occasionally pro-
test.6" The Commission noted United States proposed reservations to
the American Convention but ignored United States ratification of the
Fourth Geneva Convention14 and its signature without reservation of
other human rights treaties barring execution of those under the age of
eighteen. 5
The problems with this opinion suggest that the Commission, in its
requests for advisory opinions, should refer difficult interpretive legal
questions to the Court. The Court's strength lies in its legal ability as a
juridical body. It has the ability to shape the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Convention, Declaration, and other human rights instru-
ments through its opinions and decisions. Advisory opinions in particu-
lar are well-suited to the enunciation of general legal principles which
may contribute to the development of human rights law in the Western
Hemisphere.
D. PUBLICITY
In the long-term, the hiring of a good press officer would vastly im-
prove the Inter-American system. The mobilization of public opinion
remains the major avenue for improving the behavior of states in the
human rights field. A disturbing amount of ignorance about the Inter-
American system persists in the United States, even in cases to which
the United States is a party. Several possibilities exist to remedy this
lack of information.
First, there should be a consistent Commission policy of publishing
all decisions in individual cases as well as all country studies. An an-
63. See Fisheries Case, (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Judgment of Dec. 18)
(finding a rule of international law inapplicable to Norway because of the persistent
objections of Norway to the rule).
64. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560 T.I.A.S. No. 3365, at 3408, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 330.
65. See, e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(5), opened
for signature, Dec. 16, 1966 G.A. Res. 220A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 16) at 53,
U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (prohib-
iting execution of pregnant women and any person under the age of eighteen).
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nual statistical analysis, like those in the annual reports of the Human
Rights Committee to the United Nations General Assembly, would as-
sist in evaluating the system. An annual report would state how many
petitions were received, how many were handled without opening a file,
how many were forwarded to governments for their response, how
many were decided on the merits, and how many resulted in remedies
for the individuals involved.
The current publications policy of the Commission remains unclear.
Under the Convention, if a case is not referred to the Court or settled,
the Commission may, by majority vote, issue an opinion and conclu-
sions concerning the issue." If the Commission adopts a report, the
report must include recommendations and a prescribed period within
which the state must take remedial measures.67 After the expiration of
the specified time period, another Commission vote decides whether the
state has taken adequate measures and whether to publish the report. 8
For non-states parties to the Convention, the Regulations provide
that the Commission may publish the final decision on a petition after
issuing it to the state with any recommendations and a deadline for
their implementation, 9 if the state does not adopt the recommenda-
tions of the Commission within the deadline referred to.70 The policy
seems to indicate that the Commission should publish only failures to
respond to or adopt Commission recommendations; if so, the Commis-
sion has not followed this policy.71 Commission policy requires clarifica-
tion, if necessary by an amendment to the Regulations specifying a
general policy in favor of publication. As the policy is currently imple-
mented, no one reading the Regulations and reports of the Commission
can be certain what the Commission will publish and what it will not.
Once there is a general publication policy, there should be an order
form for publications included at the back of every publication the
Commission and the Court issue. In addition, there should be an an-
nual listing of all documents, reports, and decisions the Commission
and the Court issue.
Moreover, use of the findings of the Commission and the Court in
individual cases and country studies should be improved. Evidence
66. American Convention, supra, note 1, art. 51.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Commission Regulations, supra note 2, art. 53.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Case 2141, IN'ER-Abi. C.H.R. 25, 43, OEA/ser. L./V/ll.54, doe. 9
rev. (1981) (illustrating a case, popularly called the Baby Boy Case, where the Com-
mission found the United States not in violation of human rights, but published the
decision in its 1979-80 Annual Report).
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could be presented in domestic cases where the human rights situation
in a particular country is in question, as in the Haitian Refugee Case"
or Filartiga7 3 Amicus briefs also could be filed or expert testimony
could be given in court cases where the issue involves a human rights
matter. Finally, presentations could be made to Congress during hear-
ings on foreign assistance and human rights.
74
E. OTHER PROPOSALS
Other possible improvements exist for human rights procedures in
the Inter-American system. First, the system would benefit from regu-
lar self-analysis. Every four to five years the Commission should hold a
general meeting to evaluate its laws and procedures, to examine how
the institutions function, and to discuss how the members might im-
prove the system. This would ensure regular consideration of the effec-
tiveness of the system.
In addition, the Commission should consider appointing counsel to
those victims of human rights violations who need legal assistance but
cannot afford it. The members could perhaps establish a fund for vic-
tims that would provide legal aid. As an alternative or supplement, the
Commission should recognize the successful petitioner's right to request
costs of proceedings from the state.
To support human rights teaching institutions the Commission could
provide grants and scholarships. This would facilitate further training
of professionals, including teachers. This would also facilitate the dis-
semination of human rights texts and materials.
Finally, if the Commission would promote hemispheric unity, it
would enhance the potential of the system. The membership of Canada
in the OAS, with its laudable record in human rights, would be a great
asset to the system. Members should use all institutional efforts to en-
courage Canada to join the OAS or at least to ratify the American
Convention.
CONCLUSION
The Inter-American system constitutes an ambitious compilation of
laws and procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.
72. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
73. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
74. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 502B, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1983)
(describing the policy of the United States as incorporated in this act, as one that does
not give security assistance to governments that engage in gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights).
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Like all other human rights systems, it is of recent origin and develop-
ment. Because of its youth, the system has yet to live up to its potential
as an effective recourse for victims of human rights violations. Empha-
sizing the strengths of each institution in the system will assist this
process. In addition, devoting more time and attention to promotional
activities may prevent the creation of new victims. The Inter-American
system has succeeded in halting many human rights violations; its
work, however, has just begun.
